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IDENTIFYING JOINT EMPLOYMENT IS AS EASY AS ABC
Marc Peralta*†
I. INTRODUCTION
In America’s current political climate, “Fight for $15” has become a
common slogan among progressive activists.1 This political movement
demands an increase of the federal minimum wage to fifteen dollars per
hour.2 Under federal law, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) currently
provides employees the right to a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.3
Often overlooked in America’s political discourse, however, is the
predicate for receiving such protections in the first place: the legal
status of employment.4 Moreover, even when workers are nominally
entitled to such protections, the material ability for workers to exercise
such rights has been significantly undercut by businesses through
elaborate means of shedding employment liability.5
Both New Jersey’s Wage and Hour Law (NJWHL) and Wage
Payment Law (NJPWL) protect a minimum wage for “employees.”6 For
example, when one walks into an office building, one may presume
reception workers, maintenance workers, or janitors are all employees
of the company that owns or operates the building. Such a presumption
J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2021. I am deeply grateful to my
faculty advisor Dean Timothy Glynn for his instructive guidance and support in the
drafting of this comment. I would also like to thank Professor Charles Sullivan for
discussions about employment law both in and out of the classroom, Anish Patel for the
late nights in the Rodino Library drafting our comments and debating legal theory, and
the rest of the Seton Hall faculty and student body who have provided me a great deal of
guidance and support throughout my law school career.
1 FIGHT FOR $15, https://fightfor15.org/c-petition/for-workers/ (last visited Nov.
21, 2020).
2 Id.
3 29 U.S.C.S. § 206(a)(1)(c) (2020).
4 29 U.S.C.S. § 206(a) (2020) (“Every employer shall pay to each of his employees . . .
.”) (emphasis added).
5 See, e.g., DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 142 (2014).
6 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a (2020) (establishing the minimum wage for
“workers”). Hereinafter, “NJWPL” will refer to both the NJWPL and NJWHL collectively.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held the employment test for both is the same due to
their similarity of language. Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 312 (2015).
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is increasingly incorrect. There is an important caveat to the question
of employment: in all employment statutes, the statutory language
provides protection to “employees” and assigns liability for those
protections to “employers.”7 Therefore, the analysis is actually two-fold.
One side of the inquiry determines whether a worker is an employee or
an independent contractor,8 while the other side asks who the putative
employer is.9 It is this bifurcation of the employment analysis that
presents the rub. There are three major tests to determine employment
liability: the common law “right to control” test, the “economic realities”
test, and the “ABC” test.10 These tests determine the contours of
“employment” in practice. Generally, the touchstone of employment is
control.11 Wage protection statutes, like the FLSA and the NJWPL,
provide an even broader definition of employment: “to suffer or permit
to work.”12 Early child labor prohibition statutes developed this
particular language to prevent the circumvention of the prohibitions by
utilizing third-parties as intermediaries.13 Based on this language, the
economic-realities test has been developed by the circuit courts as an
attempt to broaden the suffer-or-permit-to-work formulation of
employment beyond the touchstone of control in interpreting the
FLSA.14 The economic-realities test considers the “economic realities”
of a potential employer-employee relationship to determine whether a
worker follows the “usual path of an employee.”15 Unlike the FLSA, New
Jersey has adopted the ABC test to determine a worker’s employee
status under the NJWPL’s suffer-or-permit-to-work language.16 Under
the ABC test, employment is presumed and an employer must prove
three exhaustive and dispositive factors to disclaim employment
liability: (1) a worker’s freedom from employer control; (2) that the

7 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a4(a) (2020) (“[E]ach employer shall pay to each
of his employees . . . .”) (emphasis added).
8 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (2020) (an “employee” is “any person
suffered or permitted to work by an employer, except that independent contractors and
subcontractors shall not be considered employees.”) (emphasis added).
9 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(a) (2020) (an “employer” is “any [person]
employing any person . . . .”) (emphasis added).
10 See infra Sections III.A, IV.A& B, respectively.
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a).
12 Compare 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(g) (2020) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1 (2020) and
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a1(f) (2020).
13 See Laurence E. Norton, II, Analyzing a Company’s “Joint Employer” Liability for
Overtime Pay Under Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws, 88 PA. B. ASS’N. Q. 10, 12-13
(2017).
14 See discussion infra Section IV..
15 See generally, Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727-29 (1947).
16 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 316 (2015).
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nature of work performed is outside of the employer’s usual course of
business; (3) and that the worker’s profession will continue regardless
of the employer’s business.17 The ABC test is generally considered the
broadest of the three tests, providing the most protection to workers.18
Despite New Jersey’s adoption of such a broad employment test, its
effectiveness has been cast into serious doubt by a recent case from the
New Jersey Appellate Division, Perez v. Access Bio, Inc.19 Under the jointemployment doctrine, an employee may have multiple employers that
are liable for her statutory employment rights.20 The court in Access Bio
held that the ABC test is limited to only the first inquiry of employment
liability, whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor,
and not to the second inquiry, who are the employers, in cases of alleged
joint-employment.21 In order to identify multiple putative jointemployers, the economic-realities test developed for the FLSA applies
instead of the ABC test.22 Therefore, whether the ABC test or the
economic-realities test applies depends on where a putative employer
stands in relation to other putative employers and the putative
employee. This framework places the effectiveness of the ABC test, and
the remedial purpose of New Jersey’s wage protection laws, in
significant jeopardy.
The stakes of employment status are high for both businesses and
labor. While employment protection laws like the FLSA or NJWPL are a
boon to workers, they represent a corresponding liability and cost to
employers. In response, businesses have found increasingly novel and
complex ways to “shed” their employment liability, while still benefiting
from workers’ labor. Firms achieve this by carefully structuring their
organizations within the two-fold employment analysis.
The
consequences of this “workplace fissuring” can be devastating to
workers. Fissuring schemes create a race to the bottom among the
labor-providing third-party firms. As labor is pushed further away from
leading firms, the market becomes increasingly fractious and
competitive. Competition drives down the overall cost of labor, as well
as third-party firms’ ability to comply with employment laws and
remain profitable. In addition, the sheer volume of small third-party
firms makes employment law difficult to enforce. The Access Bio court’s
Id. at 305-06.
See, e.g., id. at 314-15.
19 See, Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17
(Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019).
20 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.04 (2015); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2020).
21 Access Bio, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17.
22 Id. (At least in circumstances in which one party stipulates employer status.), see
also infra Section A.
17
18
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limitation of the ABC test to single employment cases leaves a
considerable gap for workplace fissuring arrangements to fall into, and
severely limits workers’ means for redress.
This comment will argue for overruling Access Bio and expanding
the ABC test to joint-employment cases under the NJWPL. Part II will
discuss in greater detail the different forms of fissured workplaces and
the resulting structural pressures that lead to employment violations.
Part III will review the historical development of the NJWPL’s suffer-orpermit-to-work definition of employment. Part IV will elaborate on the
framework of both the economic-realities test and the ABC test. Finally,
Part V will argue why Access Bio’s holding limiting the ABC test to singleemployment cases is incompatible with the statutory language and
purpose of the NJWPL and why the ABC test should be expanded to
joint-employment cases.
II. THE MATERIAL STAKES OF THE SHIFTING WORKPLACE
A. Purveyors of Labor: How Leading Firms Shed Employment
Liability
The relationships between businesses and workers have become
more complexly layered than ever before. Fundamental employment
functions—hiring, evaluation, supervision, pay, or training—which
would typically be done in-house, can now require multiple
organizations to fulfill.23
This phenomenon has been dubbed
“workplace fissuring.”24 Business organizations, like a rock with cracks
in it, have been splitting over time.25 But workplace fissuring is a new
name for an old phenomenon.26
Sweatshop labor in the garment industry is one of the oldest forms
of workplace fissuring.27 In a classic sweating system, manufacturers
divide their production lines into discrete parts.28 These manufacturers
outsource the different labor parts of the production line to subcontractors for lump sums,29 and “jobbers” then assemble the required
WEIL, supra note 5, at 3-4, 7.
WEIL, supra note 5, at 5, 7.
25 WEIL, supra note 5, at 7.
26 WEIL, supra note 5, at 7. (attributing workplace fissuring to the past three
decades), 224 (recognizing garment sweatshops from the 1800s as one of the oldest
forms of workplace fissuring).
27 WEIL, supra note 5, at 224.
28 See Bruce Goldstein, et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983,
997 (1999).
29 See id. at 1056-57.
23
24
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labor for piecemeal wages to “sweat out” the difference between the
lump sum contract payment and the actual wages paid by the contractor
for production.30 Jobbers are typically workmen who have saved
enough capital required to bid on contracts.31 The primary benefit for
leading firms utilizing a sweating system is the externalization of labor
costs onto third-party firms.32 By pushing the cost of labor into smaller
and more competitive markets between jobbers, wages are squeezed
tighter.33 Therefore, the cost of labor falls in turn. Beginning with the
rise of employment protections, particularly child labor laws, leading
firms used workplace fissuring as a means to avoid employment
liability.34 Along with the benefits of more competitive labor markets,
third-party fissuring transforms these jobbers into sacrificial lambs,
assuming the employment liability in place of leading firms.35
Sweatshops can be classified into different types: the inside shop
and the outside shop.36 The inside shop is conducted on the leading
firm’s premises.37 Despite being on the leading firm’s premises, the
workers are legally employed by some other middle-man contractor.38
In contrast, the outside shop is not on the leading firm’s premises, but
the labor conducted therein is for the leading firm’s production line and
benefit.39 At bottom, the sweatshop, whatever its form, acts as an
intermediary that insulates the leading firm from employment
liability.40

See id. at 1056.
Id.
32 WEIL, supra note 5, at 224-26; see also Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1056.
33 WEIL, supra note 5, at 224-26.
34 Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1014.
35 See, e.g., Michael Grabell, The Expendables: How the Temps Who Power Corporate
Giants Are Getting Crushed, PROPUBLICA: TEMP LAND (June 27, 2013),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-expendables-how-the-temps-who-powercorporate-giants-are-getting-crushe (“She said that after she returned to work from
surgery in 2002, the compact-disc warehouse she worked at told her it could no longer
employ her because she didn’t have [residency] papers. They directed her to a temp
firm, she said, and a few years later, she returned to the same warehouse, [doing the
same work,] still undocumented.”).
36 There are three identified categories of sweatshops, but, for the purposes of this
comment, “family shops” will not be discussed. Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1057.
37 Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1057.
38 See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 724-26 (1947)
(explaining defendant slaughterhouse’s argument that the plaintiff workers, despite
working on the slaughterhouse premises, were contractually employed by another meat
boner).
39 Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1058-59.
40 Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1059.
30
31
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New developments in fissuring schemes have retained remarkable
parallels to the sweating system. Staffing agencies have risen in the past
sixty years to fill a similar niche as the inside sweatshop. In a similar
way that the sweating system pushes labor costs and liability onto
smaller entities, a staffing agency gives leading firms “flexibility” in their
workforce.41 As one advertisement from Kelly Girl, one of the first
prominent staffing agencies, put it: “[w]hen the workload drops, you
drop her.”42 Staffing agencies act as intermediaries between leading
firms and their workers. When a staffing agency takes on all of the
responsibilities as an employer of the leading firm’s laborers, leading
firms can simply command the required number of “bodies” necessary
for their needs.43 Besides the ability to command labor power at a whim,
the staffing agency also takes on the liability of complying with
employment regulations.44 These agencies recruit workers, pay wages,
and withhold taxes.45 Despite the formal employment relationship
between the worker and the agency, workers are sent out to a leading
firm’s premises to provide only the leading firm with labor.46 Typical
examples of labor provided range from vegetable cutting and fish
cleaning to packaging and assembly.47 These workers form the
productive backbone for such companies as Walmart, Macy’s, Nike,
Philips, and Frito-Lay.48
Franchises are another example of modern workplace fissuring.
Although the parallels are not as stark as those between staffing
agencies and inside sweatshops, some franchising industries form
something akin to a floating outside workshop. As an example, unlike
the permanent premises of a typical jobber’s outside shop, janitorial

41 Michael Grabell, The Expendables: How the Temps Who Power Corporate Giants Are
Getting
Crushed,
PROPUBLICA:
TEMP
LAND
(June
27,
2013),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-expendables-how-the-temps-who-powercorporate-giants-are-getting-crushe.
42 Id.
43 See generally, Grabell, supra note 41 (“[A woman] goes to the counter and asks the
dispatchers if they think there will be work today. They tell her there’s not much but to
wait a little longer in case a company calls to say they need more bodies.”) (emphasis
added).
44 See, e.g., Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *2-3
(Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019) (holding that staffing agency, not a leading firm
pharmaceutical manufacturer, to be employer of temporary workers despite work
occurring primarily within manufacturing plant and temporary employee tenures of
multiple years).
45 Id.
46 Grabell, supra note 41.
47 Grabell, supra note 41.
48 Grabell, supra note 41.
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franchises move workers from client to client.49 A franchise is a large
and well-known brand, such as Jan-Pro or Coverall, that does not
provide labor directly to customers.50 Instead, the franchisor sells the
franchise to an “entrepreneur” to own and operate as a separate legal
entity from the franchisor.51 This sale includes giving the franchisee
access to the franchisor’s brand name, an initial customer list, training
in the franchisor’s cleaning methods, supplies and equipment, and
“advice and counseling.”52 All of these benefits are purchased from the
franchisor for an initial fee.53 The franchisee, acting as its own business,
then provides the necessary labor to its customers.54
Despite the franchisee’s legal distinction as a separate business
from the franchisor, the primary business relationship exists between
the franchisor and the customer.55 The franchisor, not the franchisee,
coordinates and communicates with the franchisee’s clients.56 The
franchisor bills the franchisee’s clients and then passes along the funds
after deducting the relevant “Royalty Fee, Management Fee, Sales &
Marketing Fee . . . and any other amounts due to [the franchisor].”57 The
franchisee never receives money directly from its nominal clients.58
Even where a franchisee finds new clients, they must be referred to the
franchisor, who then sets the terms and conditions of the franchisee’s
work for that client.59 Like the staffing agency and sweatshop, the
franchise model allows the franchisor to shed employment liability.
Unlike the staffing agency, the franchise utilizes multiple layers of
separation. In these cases, the actual janitorial workers, cleaning in
various public facilities, warehouses, and professional offices,60 are
separated from the businesses they labor for by at least two levels of
fissuring.61 The janitorial workers are the contractual employees of the
franchisee alone, not the franchisor, nor of the customers the workers
labor for.
See WEIL, supra note 5, at 133-34.
WEIL, supra note 5, at 133-34.
51 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 133-34.
52 WEIL, supra note 5, at 134.
53 WEIL, supra note 5, at 134.
54 WEIL, supra note 5, at 136, fig. 6.2 (modelling the organizational structure of a
major janitorial service franchise).
55 WEIL, supra note 5, at 135.
56 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 135.
57 WEIL, supra note 5, at 135. (quoting Jan-Pro Unit Franchise Disclosure Document,
May 2010).
58 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 135.
59 WEIL, supra note 5, at 135.
60 WEIL, supra note 5, at 134.
61 WEIL, supra note 5, at 136, fig. 6.2.
49
50
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B. Seismic Consequences: Workplace Fissuring Encourages
Workplace Violations
Workplace fissuring benefits are far reaching. Ancillary services to
a firm’s “core competencies,” such as cleaning or security, are simply not
in the firm’s best interest to manage themselves.62 The fissuring that
occurs in the hotel sector are emblematic of this benefit. The core
competency of a hotel is the “experience” it provides to customers and
the confidence any individual customer has in a hotel brand.63 Cleaning
and other services are incidental to the primary driver of a hotel’s
business.64 The skills required for such incidental services are typically
low, which opens up opportunities for fissuring schemes like
sweatshops, staffing agencies, or franchising services.65 Outsourcing
these employment relationships can significantly reduce leading firms’
management expenses from hiring, firing, supervising, providing fringe
benefits, and employment and labor law compliance.66
The coal mining industry provides an illustrative example of how
shedding employment liability can save significant operating expenses
for leading firms. Between 1980 and 1983, Island Creek Coal, a major
coal mining firm, shifted from using unionized in-house labor to
contracting out work for smaller and more dangerous mining jobs.67
These smaller contractors took on all of the employment liability for the
labor provided, including paying employment taxes, managing
personnel, and contributing to unemployment and retirement funds.68
By shedding employment liability, large mining companies, such as
Island Creek, were estimated to save between three to five dollars per
each ton of coal on average.69 In 1991, Island Creek reported production

See WEIL, supra note 5, at 49-50
WEIL, supra note 5, at 50.
64 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 50.
65 See Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 998. (Certain aspects of production can be
labor intensive while not requiring skilled labor, therefore the key for leading firms
becomes finding a steady supply of workers.).
66 See, e.g., Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *2-3
(Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019); Grabell, supra note 41 (“. . . Never costs you for
unemployment taxes and social security payments. . . . Never costs you fringe benefits.”).
Another non-quantifiable benefit of shedding employment is the shedding of moral
responsibility that employers owe to employees. By outsourcing labor, workers are
tradeable like any other commodity, sight unseen, for the lowest possible price. Timothy
Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law? Accountability for Wage and Hour
Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 101, 114
(2011).
67 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 104-05.
68 WEIL, supra note 5, at 102-04.
69 WEIL, supra note 5, at 103.
62
63
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of nineteen million tons of coal.70 Assuming that its less desirable,
subcontracted work consisted of only five percent of its total
production, Island Creek saved between $2.9 million and $4.8 million
that year.71
This average cost savings says nothing to the shielding of leading
firms from employment liability if a subcontractor goes bankrupt or
violates employment law protections. Even though Island Creek
contracted mining work out to third parties, the union’s collective
bargaining agreement required that the contractors hire Island Creek’s
unionized workers.72 Of the sixty contractors that Island Creek Coal
used for its less desirable mining operations, fifty-two went out of
business.73
This left approximately $170 million in unpaid
unemployment and retirement funds.74 Even though the workers were
formerly unionized Island Creek employees, working in Island Creek
owned or affiliated mines, Island Creek Coal was fully insulated from
any liability to pay out the $170 million in missing funds.75
While leading firms may benefit immensely from shedding
employment liability onto smaller contractor middlemen, the
consequences for workers—and society—can be devastating. The very
nature of fissuring schemes encourages employment law violations.76
Returning to the janitorial franchising example, franchisee owners are
typically led to believe that they can earn up to twenty-five dollars per
hour from their clients.77 But, as earlier discussed, the franchisee does
not set its own terms with clients. Like a sweatshop jobber, the
franchisor sets the prices to clients based on a service package rather
than by the hour.78 Additionally, like sweatshop jobbers, the fractious
nature of franchisees leads to intense price-based competition.79 This
piecemeal pricing system ultimately leads to actual rates between

70 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PERFORMANCE PROFILES OF MAJOR ENERGY PRODUCERS 1992, 55
(1994), available at https://www.eia.gov/finance/archive/020692.pdf> (last visited
Oct. 03, 2020).
71 In 2020 dollars, Island Creek Coal would save between approximately $5,544,238
and $9,176,670. U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020).
72 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 103.
73 WEIL, supra note 5, at 104.
74 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 104.
75 WEIL, supra note 5, at 104-05.
76 WEIL, supra note 5, at 131.
77 WEIL, supra note 5, at 137.
78 WEIL, supra note 5, at 137. (“For a small client who requires very basic janitorial
services, contracts are often bid on the basis of a price per service visit.”).
79 WEIL, supra note 5, at 136.
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approximately thirteen and seventeen dollars per hour in revenue.80 At
these rates, it becomes structurally impossible for a franchisee to
comply with minimum wage laws and simultaneously turn a profit.81 As
workplace fissuring pushes the question of employment into the low
end of the labor market, it creates fertile ground for employment
violations. Besides the usual problems of employment law enforcement
due to the vulnerability of low-wage workers,82 enforcement at the low
end of the labor market comes down to a game of Whac-a-Mole.83 In the
janitorial services market, the price of entry is low while the labor pool
is high, resulting in the growth of franchisees despite its inherent
unprofitability.84 The small size and quick turnover of these types of
firms allow them to fly under the radar.85 These smaller, fractured, and
likely undercapitalized contractors are also likely judgment proof.86
Like the Island Creek example, bankruptcy may prevent workers from
receiving any meaningful redress for employment violations. Thus,
enforcement should not focus on the level of the third-party violators
but on the fissured leading firms that drive the employment violations
themselves. One available tool for both workers and employment law
enforcement is the doctrine of joint-employment, in which multiple
firms can be held jointly liable for employment law compliance.87 The
Access Bio court’s limitation of the ABC test in the joint-employment
context, however, severely hampers the ability to adequately address
the wage violations under the NJWPL that are systematically driven by
leading firms. Overruling Access Bio and expanding the ABC test to jointemployment cases would place a powerful tool into the hands of
workers themselves to materially protect their rights.88

80 WEIL, supra note 5, at 138, tbl. 6.2 (comparing the average per service piecemeal
price of franchised janitorial services versus the estimated actual price per hour).
81 See WEIL, supra note 5, at 142.
82 See Glynn, supra note 66, at 110 (“ . . . the social and economic vulnerability of lowwage workers, their lack of awareness of workplace rights, limited resources for public
enforcement, limited remedies and other incentives for private enforcement, procedural
hurdles, and the limited effect of unions and advocacy organizations.”).
83 WEIL, supra note 5, at 226. (focusing on contractor/subcontractor level of the
garment industry led to a “seemingly endless cat-and-mouse game between the WHD
and small-scale contractors”).
84 WEIL, supra note 5, at 140-41.
85 Glynn, supra note 66, at 110.
86 Glynn, supra note 66, at 110.
87 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2020).
88 Massachusetts shows signs of success for this method of holding at least
franchisors accountable for franchisee wage violations using the ABC test. See, e.g.,
Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 82-84 (D. Mass. 2010).
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III. TO SUFFER OR PERMIT TO WORK
A. The Touchstone of Control: The Tort Origins of Employment
The common law concept of “employment” has agency law roots.
Under agency principles, employment is just one form of a principalagent relationship.89 A principal is one who controls an agent that acts
on the principal’s behalf.90 Although this sounds simple, not all
principals are employers.91 Conversely, not all agents are employees.92
An employer is specifically a principal of an employee.93 In general,
agency law concerns itself with the principal’s liability for an agent’s
conduct, such as entering into contracts with third parties.94 The legal
distinction of employment, as opposed to other agency relationships,
pertains to determining an employer’s vicarious tort liability for
employees acting within the scope of employment, in other words,
determining when an employer can be held liable for the actions of an
employee.95 Since chains of vicarious liability are severed by
independent action, the question of employment under agency law must
be resolved using the right-to-control test.96
The right-to-control test focuses on whether an employer has the
right to control the “manner and means” of an employee97, i.e., the
physical conduct of an employee’s performance.98 The test as applied
must consider the totality-of-the-circumstances with a non-exhaustive
list of important, but not necessarily dispositive, factors.99 These factors
may include the physical control that can be exercised by the putative
employer; the nature of the service performed; the skill required for the
work; the length of service; and the terms of compensation.100 It is
important to reiterate, however, that agency law specifically deals with
the extension of tort liability and the power of an agent to bind a

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2006).
Id.
91 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 14N cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2006).
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.01 cmt. c.
93 Id. § 7.03(2).
94 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 7.03-7.08.
95 Also referred to as the doctrine of respondeat superior. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY, § 7.03 et seq.
96 Id. § 1.01 cmt. f(1). See also Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 307-08 (2015)
(referring to the common law agency approach as the “right to control” test).
97 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 307.
98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 14N (Independent contractors are not
employees.).
99 Id. § 220(2).
100 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.02.
89
90
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principal.101 Agency law does not deal with the conditions of
employment.102
B. Beyond Control: A Short History of Suffer‐or‐Permit‐to‐
Work Employment
What does it mean to “employ” under employment laws? Most
employment statutes do not provide an express definition of
“employment” or “employee.”103 Moreover, even where such definitions
are provided they are often circular.104 In light of this, the Supreme
Court has provided that the common law right-to-control test
presumptively applies unless otherwise defined in a relevant statute.105
Although the FLSA has a circular definition of “employer” and
“employee,” it stands unique among federal employment statutes.106
The FLSA bridges the gap between employer and employee with its
definition of “employ,” which “includes to suffer or permit to work.”107
State wage protection laws, like the NJWPL, emulate the FLSA’s sufferor-permit-to-work language in its definition of “employee.”108 In terms
101 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, §§ 7.03-7.08; see also, Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J. concurring)
(discussing the origins of “employment” in the context of agency law as simply a means
to determine where a chain of vicarious tort liability ends).
102 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1544 (Easterbrook, J. concurring) (“The reasons for
blocking vicarious liability at a particular point have nothing to do with the functions of
the FLSA.”) (emphasis added).
103 James Reif, ‘To Suffer or Permit to Work’: Did Congress and State Legislatures Say
What They Meant and Mean What They Said?, 6 NE. UNIV. L. J. 347, 350 (2014).
104 Id. at 350 n.1 (“The following are examples of federal laws that do not include a
definition of ‘employ’ but do contain a circular or otherwise unhelpful definition of
‘employee’”)’ National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C.S. 152(3) (2011) (providing
that ‘[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . .’); Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1972, 29 U.S.C.S. 1002(6) (2011) (‘employee’ defined as ‘any
individual employed by an employer’); Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C.S. 652(6) (2010) (‘employee’ defined as ‘an employee of an employer who is
employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce,’ even while ‘employ’ is
not defined).”).
105 TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW:
PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATION 6 (4th ed. 2019).
106 Compare 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(d) (2020) (“‘Employer’ includes any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . .”), with
29 U.S.C.S. § 203(e)(1) (“[T]he term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an
employer.”).
107 Compare 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(g), with 29 U.S.C.S. § 152(3) (2011), and 29 U.S.C.S. §
1002(6) (2011), and 29 U.S.C.S § 652(6) (2010).
108 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (2020) (“‘Employee’ means any person suffered or
permitted to work by an employer, except that independent contractors and
subcontractors shall not be considered employees.”) (emphasis added).
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of plain language, suffer-or-permit-to-work provides the broadest
definition of employment, and therefore requires something other than
the right-to-control test.109 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“a broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be
difficult to frame.”110 The formulation of the language has a long history
in contemplating relationships outside the right-to-control test for
employment.111 As will be discussed below, over the past one hundred
years of interpreting suffer-or-permit-to-work employment, different
tests have been applied to determine the definition’s outer limit.
Suffer-or-permit-to-work was originally formulated to eradicate
the evils of child labor.112 In the seminal case People ex rel. v. Sheffield
Farms‐Slawson‐Decker Co., the New York Court of Appeals interpreted
New York’s child labor law that used “suffer or permit to work” to define
employment.113 The alleged employer-defendant was a milk delivery
business.114 One of the defendant’s delivery drivers paid a thirteenyear-old boy to prevent theft of the driver’s bottles in violation of New
York’s child labor law.115 The court held that the defendant milk
delivery business was equally liable for the child labor violation as the
employee delivery driver who hired the boy.116 The court held that the
defendant employer had a duty to reasonably inquire into the
conditions of its business and failed to prevent the illegal child labor.117
The Sheffield Farms court articulated several fundamental
principles in interpreting New York’s child labor law that are still
applied in the child labor context today.118 First, and most importantly,
Judge Cardozo interpreted the words of the statute in their common
meaning: “Permission, like sufferance, connotes something less than
consent. Sufferance, like permission, connotes some opportunity for

109 See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728-29 (1947); see also, Sec’y
of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J. concurring) (“The definition, written in the passive, sweeps in almost
any work done on the employer’s premises, potentially any work done for the
employer’s benefit or with the employer’s acquiescence.”).
110 United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945).
111 Norton, supra note 13, at 12-13.
112 See id.
113 People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 30-31 (1918).
114 Id. at 27-28.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 29-33.
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 570.113(a) (2020) (articulating the same principles as
Sheffield Farms in interpreting the FLSA’s own child labor provision).
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knowledge.”119 This interpretation is the foundation for the two-factor
test that has become the basis for the FLSA’s own interpretation of
suffer-or-permit-to-work under its child labor provisions: (1) whether
an employer knows or should have known that a child is performing
work for the employer, and (2) whether an employer acquiesced or
failed to prevent the child from performing work.120 Moreover, this
construction of “suffer or permit to work” inherently implicates liability
for multiple employers:
[The law] is directed primarily against the employer, and only
secondarily against others as they may aid and abet him. He
must neither create nor suffer in his business the prohibited
conditions. The command is addressed to him. Since the duty is
his, he may not escape it by delegating it to others. He breaks
the command of the statute if he employs the child himself. He
breaks it equally if the child is employed by agents to whom
he has delegated “his own power to prevent.”121
The Sheffield Farms test went all the way to the top, considering the
employee who hired the boy as someone that “aided or abetted” the
leading milk delivery business in utilizing child labor.122 Although
Sheffield Farms does not expressly reject the right-to-control test in this
context, it does expressly reject the tort conception of employment
under the suffer-or-permit-to-work paradigm: “[This case] is not an
instance of respondeat superior. It is the case of the non-performance of
a non‐delegable duty.”123
Other courts applied the principles laid out in Sheffield Farms to
employment fissuring schemes utilizing independent contractors as
third-party labor middlemen.124 In Commonwealth v. Hong, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts found that the use of an independent contractor
as a middleman to hire an underage performer did not relieve the
business of employment liability under suffer-or-permit-to-work
employment.125 In virtually every case involving a child labor violation
by an independent contractor, courts have held leading firms liable
where the leading firm had an opportunity for knowledge of, and failed
119 People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 31 (1918)
(emphasis added).
120 See 29 C.F.R. § 570.113(a) (2020).
121 Sheffield Farms, 225 N.Y. at 29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
122 See id.
123 Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
124 See Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1043 (discussing Commonwealth v. Hong,
158 N.E. 759 (Mass. 1927)).
125 Commonwealth v. Hong, 158 N.E. 759 (Mass. 1927).
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to prevent, the independent contractor from using child labor on the
leading firm’s behalf.126 Therefore, it becomes clear from Sheffield
Farms and its progeny that suffer-or-permit-to-work necessarily
implicates joint-employment. As Judge Cardozo held: “[An employer]
must . . . stand or fall with those whom he selects to act for him.”127
IV.

A SQUARED CIRCLE: THE DILEMMA OF TWO TESTS FOR
EMPLOYMENT

Under the NJWPL an “employee” is “any person suffered or
permitted to work . . . except that independent contractors and
subcontractors shall not be considered employees.”128 The NJWHL not
only defines “employer” and “employee,” but also defines “to employ,”
which includes “to suffer or permit to work.”129 Likewise, the FLSA’s
definition of employment “includes to suffer or permit to work.”130 Yet
the state and federal versions, despite their similar statutory language,
employ two different tests.131 The FLSA applies the so-called “economic
realities” test, which was handed down by the Supreme Court in the
seminal case Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, which the circuit courts
have further developed.132 On the state level, New Jersey applies the
ABC test for interpreting the NJWPL’s suffer-or-permit-to-work
language, at least for cases involving a single putative employer.133 But
Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1043-44.
People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 30 (1918) The
Department of Labor still uses this construction in its interpretation of 29 U.S.C.S. §
212(c) (2020). See 29 C.F.R. § 570.113(a) (2020).
128 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (West 2020).
129 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a1(f) (West 2020). The Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that because of the similar statutory language of the NJWPL and NJWHL, the ABC
test was equally appropriate for determining “employee” status under either. Hargrove
v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 312 (2015).
130 29 U.S.C.S § 203(g) (2020).
131 Compare Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 316 (applying the ABC test), with Donovan v.
DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1385 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying a version of the
economic-realities test, dubbed the “Sureway Cleaners test,” developed by the Ninth
Circuit in Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981)).
132 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726-27 (1947) (this case is also
the first, and only, Supreme Court decision dealing with the doctrine of jointemployment under the FLSA); See also Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 310-11 (referring to the
“economic realities” test developed for interpreting the FLSA); Reif, supra note 103, at
353 (Circuit Courts have primarily developed the economic-realities test based on the
Rutherford factors.).
133 See generally Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 289; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:56-16.1 (2020)
(regulation providing that the ABC test as found in New Jersey’s Unemployment
Compensation Law be used to interpret the NJWPL.). See also discussion infra Section V
(arguing that the New Jersey Appellate Division’s holding in Perez v. Access Bio, Inc.
changes the analysis when dealing with multiple putative employers).
126
127
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in the recent case Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., the New Jersey Appellate
Division held that the NJWPL actually applies each test, depending on
the number of putative employers.134
The definitions of both employer and employee under the NJWPL
implicate the other.135 Despite their intertwined nature, the two
definitions of “what is an employee” and “what is an employer” creates
a bifurcated analysis of employment law liability. Therefore, the first
inquiry is concerned with the nature of the employment relationship
and whether a given worker is an employee or independent
contractor.136 Only employees are entitled to protections provided by
employment statutes.137 If the worker is an employee of someone, the
next inquiry must identify who are the liable employers.138 Under the
doctrine of joint-employment, an employee may have multiple
employers who are liable for employment law compliance.139
The New Jersey Appellate Division in Access Bio held, “the
[Hargrove] Court did not make its holding . . . applicable to all
employment status disputes under the WHL . . . , but rather focused on
the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor.”140
Therefore, Access Bio has bounded the ABC test within that first inquiry
of employment liability.141 When determining joint-employment under
the NJWPL, the second inquiry, who are the employers, may apply the
economic-realities test or the ABC test, depending on where the putative
employers stand in relation to each other and the putative employee.142
Upon careful examination, however, such a standard proves
134 See Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019). See also discussion infra Section V (interpreting the Access
Bio court’s holding).
135 An “employer” is “any [person] employing any person . . . .” An “employee” is “any
person suffered or permitted to work by an employer, except that independent
contractors and subcontractors shall not be considered employees.” N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:11-4.1(a)-(b) (West 2020) (emphasis added).
136 Glynn, supra note 66, at 109.
137 GLYNN, supra note 105, at 3-6; see also Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court,
416 P.3d 1, 5 (2018) (discussing the stakes of improper employment classification).
138 Glynn, supra note 66, at 109.
139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.04 (2015); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a)
(2020).
140 Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. July 23, 2019) (emphasis added).
141 The court in Curry v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, reasoned similarly, limiting the
application of the ABC test to cases determining if a worker is an employee or
independent contractor to a single putative employer. 23 Cal. App. 5th 289, 314 (2018).
142 See Access Bio, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17. Both the Curry and Access Bio courts
did not address how the ABC test would apply in a case contemplating multiple
employers where one party did not stipulate its employer status.
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unworkable outside the specific facts of Access Bio. In order to
understand why, the two tests must be compared in greater detail.
A. The Economic Realities Test
In the landmark case, Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, the
Supreme Court first decided what constitutes employment under the
FLSA’s suffer-or-permit-to-work definition for claims of wage and hour
violations.143
The Court acknowledged that the FLSA’s broad
employment definition captures more relationships than the common
law right-to-control test.144 The Court also recognized the unity of the
suffer-or-permit-to-work definition between the wage, hour, and child
labor provisions, as well as the language’s child labor prohibition
antecedent.145 Despite this recognition, the Court found that suffer-orpermit-to-work did not provide a limit to the employer-employee
relationship, and did not engage at all with either an “opportunity for
knowledge” or “the power to prevent” that was articulated in Sheffield
Farms.146 Instead, the court adopted the Tenth Circuit’s approach in
determining whether sub-contractor meat boners under a supervisor
meat boner were actually the employees of the slaughterhouse itself.147
The Tenth Circuit found that the sub-contractor meat boners were
indeed employees despite only being contractually employed by their
meat boner supervisor—a classic joint-employment case.148 The Tenth
Circuit held that the “underlying economic realities” showed that the
meat boners were an “integrated economic unit” of the
slaughterhouse.149 The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that workers
who follow the “usual path of an employee” are covered by the FLSA.150
The Court provided the maxim: “the determination of the relationship
does not depend on . . . isolated factors but rather upon the
circumstances of the whole activity.”151 The Court listed factors that it
found persuasive in upholding the Tenth Circuit’s ruling:
[T]he workers did a specialty job on the production line. The
responsibility under the boning contracts without material
changes passed from one boner to another. The premises and
equipment of Kaiser were used for the work. The group had
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947).
Id. at 728-29.
Id.
See id. at 728.
Id. at 726, 27, 31.
Id. at 727.
Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 726-27.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
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no business organization that could or did shift as a unit from
one slaughterhouse to another. The managing official of the
plant kept close touch on the operation. While profits to the
boners depended upon the efficiency of their work, it was
more like piecework than an enterprise that actually
depended for success upon the initiative, judgment or
foresight of the typical independent contractor.152
Since ruling on Rutherford in 1947, the Supreme Court has not
provided additional substantive guidance on the FLSA’s employment
definition or on any other suffer-or-permit-to-work employment
statutes.153 Accordingly, the circuit courts have primarily developed the
economic-realities test.154 Due to the totality-of-the-circumstances
nature of the economic-realities test and the lack of legal principle for
determining the “usual path of an employee,” any given FLSA case can
apply different weight to each factor.155 The circuit courts have
generally agreed, however, that the factors considered are neither
dispositive nor exhaustive.156 In developing the economic-realities test
through the prism of Rutherford, two common principles emerged to
determine whether an employment relationship exists: functional
control and dependence.
1. Functional Control
Circuit courts frequently cite to Rutherford as the basis for the
factors the court will consider.157 In particular, circuit courts have
focused on the fact that the slaughterhouse manager in Rutherford
frequently kept in close contact with the meat boners.158 Because the
economic-realities test as formulated supposedly goes beyond the right-

Id.
Reif, supra note 103, at 352-53; but see Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc.,
366 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1961) (In a brief opinion, the Supreme Court applied “suffer or
permit to work” in a single-employer context and found that cooperative stakeholders
were also employees of the cooperative under FLSA because the cooperative as an entity
provided the stakeholders “an opportunity to work, and [paid] them for it.” The Court
makes absolutely no mention of the right-to-control.).
154 Reif, supra note 103, at 353.
155 See Reif, supra note 103, at 354.
156 Reif, supra note 103, at 370-71; see also Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v.
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J. concurring) (“Certain
criteria have been developed to assist in determining the true nature of the relationship,
but no criterion is by itself, or by its absence, dispositive or controlling.”).
157 See, e.g., Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2003);
Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985).
158 See, e.g., Zheng, 355 F.3d at 70.
152
153
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to-control, circuit courts that apply factors related to control distinguish
between formal control and something akin to “functional control.”159
For example, in Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., the Second
Circuit rebuked the trial court for adopting a test that focused too
narrowly on formal control in determining whether the defendantgarment manufacturer was the joint-employer of garment workers who
were unquestionably employed by a contractor-middleman.160 Instead,
the Second Circuit identified six factors for the trial court to apply on
remand: (1) whether the premises were owned by the putative
employer, (2) whether the contractor-middleman could move from one
leading firm to another, (3) the extent to which the workers’ labor was
integral to the putative employer’s production line, (4) whether the
workers’ contracts could pass to new workers without material
changes, (5) the degree of supervision by the putative employer’s
agents, and (6) whether the workers predominantly labored on behalf
of the putative employer.161 The Second Circuit stated that the six
articulated factors would reveal a level of “functional control” that
would justify finding joint-employment despite not falling within the
common law conception of control.162
Similar to the Zheng court, the Third Circuit in In re Enterprise Rent‐
A‐Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigation adopted a posture
that predominantly focused on control.163 Instead of “functional
control,” the Third Circuit stated that joint-employment exists where
additional employers exert “significant control.”164 The court took the
position that joint-employment only exists where other putative
employers share governance over the “essential terms and conditions of
employment.”165 From a plain language perspective, “significant
control” seems to be an even narrower standard than “functional
control,” but the court then qualified that “[u]ltimate control is not
necessarily required[,] . . . even ‘indirect’ control may be sufficient.”166
With these principles in mind, the Third Circuit provided four factors
that consider whether the putative joint-employer can: (1) hire and fire
workers, (2) control the conditions of employment, (3) supervise the
worker’s day-to-day labor, and (4) control the worker’s records (such
159 See generally, e.g., Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69; In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour
Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012).
160 Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69.
161 Id. at 72.
162 Id.
163 Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 468.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
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as payroll, insurance, and taxes).167 Although the Second Circuit and
Third Circuit provided different factors, both courts acknowledged that
neither list is dispositive or exhaustive.168
2. Dependence
Another common principle articulated by the circuit courts is
“dependence.” In Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc.,169 the Third
Circuit, in a single-employment context, listed six factors to determine
whether a worker is “dependent upon the business to which they render
service,” such that it would justify a finding of employment.170 The Third
Circuit analyzed the following six factors: (1) the degree of control by
the business over the manner and means of the worker’s service, (2) the
worker’s opportunity for profit and loss, (3) the worker’s investment in
equipment or material required for the services provided (including
hiring helpers), (4) any special skills required for the service, (5) the
permanence of the relationship, and (6) whether the service was an
integral part of the putative employer’s business.171 The principle of
“dependence” in DialAmerica primarily relied on the last two factors.172
The court contemplated that a worker who is “economically dependent”
upon a putative employer cuts toward an employment relationship.173
But this principle is not based upon a worker’s dependence on
employment as a primary source of income.174 The court reasoned that
such a construction would be both over and under-inclusive.175
Therefore, the court focused on the permanence of the service provided
rather than the monetary compensation received.176
The Third Circuit also limited the dependence factor by
determining whether the worker’s services are economically integrated
into the putative employer’s business.177 Whether the work was
“economically integrated” into the putative employer’s business would
supposedly reveal whether a worker was capable of “transfer[ring]
Id. at 469.
Id. at 469; Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2003).
169 Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985).
170 Id. at 1382-83.
171 Id. at 1382 (citing Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir.
1981)).
172 See id. at 1385.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 See DialAmerica, 757 F.2d at 1385 n.11 (providing a hypothetical to illustrate that
such an interpretation of dependence, “would lead to senseless results if carried to its
logical conclusion”).
176 Id. at 1385-86.
177 See id. at 1385.
167
168

PERALTA (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

3/11/2021 3:07 PM

COMMENT

281

their services from place to place, as do independent contractors.”178 It
is important to note, however, that even though this particular case
focused on the worker’s dependence on the putative employer for
continued employment, the other factors the court considered material
to the analysis included aspects of control.179
B. The ABC Test
Despite the similarity of many states’ suffer-or-permit-to-work
wage protection statutes to the FLSA, a different employment test has
been developed at the state level.180 In Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, Inc., the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the ABC test should be used to
determine employment under the NJWPL’s suffer-or-permit-to-work
framework.181 Under the NJWPL, an employee is defined as “any person
suffered or permitted to work by an employer . . . .”182 The Hargrove
court expressly rejected the right-to-control or economic-realities test
as the proper analysis for employment liability under the act.183
The ABC test stands in stark contrast to both the right-to-control
test and the economic-realities test. The ABC test requires a showing
that employment characteristics are not present.184 Unlike the right-tocontrol and economic-realities test, employment is presumed, with the
burden of rebuttal falling to the putative employer to prove each
factor.185 The New Jersey ABC Test provides: “[s]ervices performed by
an individual for remuneration shall be deemed to be employment
Id.
See id. at 1386.
180 Employee or Contractor? The Complete List of Worker Classification Tests by State,
WRAPBOOK (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.wrapbook.com/worker-classification-tests-bystate/.
181 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 295 (2015); see also Dynamex Operations
W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 7 (2018) (adopting the ABC test to interpret suffer-orpermit-to-work in California’s wage orders which regulate wage and hour violations
similar to the NJWPL).
182 But such definition expressly excludes “independent contractors and
subcontractors.” N.J. STAT. ANN § 34:11-4.1(b). Although the concept of “independent
contractor” is rooted in the common law and would suggest a common law right-tocontrol test, this language merely functions as an express exception to the broad
coverage of the statutory language. In fact, the Dynamex court saw no conflict between
the independent contractor distinction and “suffer or permit to work.” Dynamex, 416
P.3d at 30.
183 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314-15. But see Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4,
2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17 (Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2019) (limiting the ABC test to
single-employment cases).
184 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)-(C) (based in New Jersey’s Unemployment
Compensation Law, which the Hargrove court formally adopted to interpret both the
NJWPL and NJWHL pursuant to N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:56-16.1).
185 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314.
178
179
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. . . .”186 Essentially, the employment presumption arises where a
worker receives consideration for her labor.187 In order to overcome
the presumption of employment, the putative employer must show:
(A) Such individual has been and will continue to be free from
control or direction over the performance of such service,
both under his contract of service and in fact; and
(B) Such service is either outside the usual course of the
business for which such service is performed, or that such
service is performed outside of all the places of business of the
enterprise for which such service is performed; and
(C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business.188
If the employer fails to satisfy any of these factors, the individual
performing services for remuneration qualifies as an employee of the
putative employer.189 The ABC test represents a fundamental paradigm
shift in determining employment status.190
1. Freedom from Control
By its plain language, the first factor, “A,” sweeps broadly; the
putative “employer must show that it neither exercised control over the
worker, nor had the ability to exercise control in terms of the completion
of the work.”191 The level of control necessary to establish employment
does not have to be pervasive, “some level of control may be
sufficient.”192 Control can be established by facts, such as: setting hours
186 N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(p) (“‘Remuneration’
means all compensation for personal services, including commission and bonuses and
the cash value of all compensation in any medium other than cash.”).
187 See Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6) (“Services
performed by an individual for remuneration shall be deemed to be employment subject
to this chapter (R.S.43:21-1 et seq.) unless . . . .”).
188 N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)-(C).
189 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314.
190 See, e.g., John Skousen, New ABC Test for Independent Contractors Sends California
Employers
Reeling,
Resources,
FISHER
PHILLIPS
(July
2,
2018),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-newsletters-article-new-abc-test-forindependent-contractors-sends; Mike Kappel, The End of an Era? How the ABC Test Could
Affect Your Use of Independent Contractors, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2018, 9:10 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikekappel/2018/08/08/the-end-of-an-era-how-theabc-test-could-affect-your-use-of-independent-contractors/#719da0351f66.
191 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 305 (emphasis added).
192 Id.; but see Law Office of Gerard C. Vince, LLC v. Bd. of Review, No. A-5441-17T2,
2019 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1846, at *8-9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sep. 3, 2019) (The court
narrowed the A-prong control analysis, concluding that the basic supervision required
of lawyers over paralegals to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct is not
enough control to establish the A-prong. The court disapproved of and rejected the
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or jobs; the reservation of a right—even absent exercising that right—
to control the manners and means of services performed; and requiring
services to be rendered by the worker and not an agent of the worker.193
Similarly to the economic realities test, the court must examine “all the
circumstances attendant to the actual performance of the work.”194
2. Outside the Usual Course of Business or Business
Premises
The second factor, “B,” under New Jersey law, contains two
disjunctive sub-factors.195 Proof of either sub-factor satisfies the entire
B-prong.196 B’s first sub-factor requires the putative employer to show
that the worker is performing services outside of her “usual course of
business.”197 For example, if a bakery that sells custom cakes hired a
plumber to fix a leaking pipe, it is fair to say that the plumber is acting
“outside” the bakery’s usual course of business.198 For a bakery which
sells custom cakes, the usual course of business relates to the labor in
making cakes.199 So, if a bakery were to hire a cake-decorator to work
on the bakery’s custom cakes, the cake-decorator would be working
within the bakery’s usual course of business.200
B’s second sub-factor requires the employer to prove that the
services performed occurred outside of all business premises.201 The
New Jersey Supreme Court has found, in the unemployment
compensation context, that “business premises” encompasses either
locations in which a putative employer has a “physical plant” or
Board’s reasoning, stating that “[u]nder the Board’s analysis, a paralegal could never be
an independent contractor.”).
193 MKI Assocs., LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., No. A-4508-17T3, 2019
N.J. Super. LEXIS 2088, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 10, 2019).
194 Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314.
195 Unlike California’s version of the ABC test, New Jersey’s “B” factor is narrower by
also allowing the prong to be satisfied if all work is done outside the putative employer’s
business premises. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6)(B), with Dynamex Operations
W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 40 (2018) (California does not include “outside all
business premises” as a disjunctive sub-factor within the B-prong.).
196 Morales v. V.M. Trucking, LLC, No. A-2898-16T4, 2019 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1567, at
*16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2019) (modeling application on unemployment
compensation jurisprudence).
197 N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6)(B).
198 Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 305 (2015) (the Court did not expand on
this requirement substantively; the Appellate Division provides more guidance applying
the ABC test after Hargrove.); see also S. 4204, 218th Leg. § 2.4.b (N.J. 2019),
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/S4500/4204_I1.HTM (proposing to remove
the second sub-factor of the B-prong entirely).
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“conducts an integral part of its business.”202 A business premise where
a putative employer “conducts an integral part of its business” does not
necessarily have to be owned by the putative employer or put out to the
world as its place of business.203 For example, in MKI Associates., LLC v.
N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., the Appellate Division found that
separate and unrelated healthcare facilities were premises that the
putative employer “conduct[ed] an integral part of its business.”204 The
court considered “providing therapy services” to be the “principal part”
of MKI’s business.205 Therefore, the healthcare facilities became
business premises because supplying therapists to work there was
“providing therapy services,” which was an integral part of MKI’s
business.206
3. Customarily Independent Trades or Businesses
The final factor, “C,” is concerned with whether the work itself is
“customarily” considered an “independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business.”207 This factor does not identify
classes of professions that one might colloquially imagine as
independent contractors and then compiling a list of those exempted.208
Instead, the employer must prove that a worker-in-question has a
“profession that will plainly persist despite the termination of the
challenged relationship.”209 Similar to the economic-realities test, the
simple label of “independent contractor” is not enough to satisfy this

202 MKI Assocs., LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., No. A-4508-17T3, 2019
N.J. Super. LEXIS 2088, at *14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 10, 2019) (quoting Carpet
Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 125 N.J. 567, 592 (1991)).
203 Id. at *15.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 N.J. STAT. ANN. 43:21-19(i)(6)(C); see also S. 4204, 218th Leg. § 2.4.c (N.J. 2019)
(proposing to broaden the C-prong by requiring the employer to prove that the
customarily independent established trade must be “of the same nature as that involved
in the work performed” (emphasis added)).
208 Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 306 (2015). But see Dynamex Operations
W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 37 (2018) (citing plumbers and electricians as
“traditional” independent contractors); Law Office of Gerard C. Vince, LLC v. Bd. of
Review, No. A-5441-17T2, 2019 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1846, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Sep. 3, 2019) (contemplating that paralegals can be either employees or independent
contractors).
209 Compare Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 306 (determining whether an enterprise exists or
will exist independent of the service relationship), with Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 39
(determining whether a worker has “independently chosen the burdens of selfemployment”).
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prong.210 The actual circumstances of the work must be considered.211
Put differently, courts will not find this prong to be satisfied if
termination of the relationship will leave the worker in the “ranks of the
unemployed.”212 Factors for determining whether a profession will
survive termination of the challenged relationship include: the number
of customers besides the putative employer the worker has in the same
line of business, whether the worker has any employees, and the extent
that the worker owns equipment or capital resources.213 These factors
speak to the “strength” of the worker’s trade.214 Where the employer
makes up a small portion of the worker’s compensation, it cuts toward
an independent trade or business.215

V. EASY AS 1, 2, 3: EXPANDING THE ABC TEST TO JOINT-EMPLOYMENT
The Access Bio court’s holding that “the [Hargrove] Court did not
make [the adoption of the ABC test] . . . applicable to all employment
status disputes under the WHL . . . , but rather focused on the distinction
between an employee and an independent contractor[,]” draws a line
between single employment cases and joint-employment cases for the
application of the ABC test.216 But this line drawing raises the obvious
question: how does one draw such a line in practice?217 The first part of
the employment inquiry determines whether a worker is an employee
or independent contractor.218 But to determine whether a worker is an
employee under any test—ABC, economic-realities, or even the right-tocontrol—there must be at least one identifiable putative employer.
For example, the control principle articulated in any of the tests
asks whether there was a degree of control over the worker.219 But who
is the one exercising the control? It is impossible to answer the first
Law Office of Gerard C. Vince, 2019 LEXIS 1846, at *8 .
Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 314.
212 Id. at 306.
213 MKI Assocs., LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., No. A-4508-17T3, 2019
N.J. Super. LEXIS 2088, at *15-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 10, 2019).
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Perez v. Access Bio, Inc., No. A-3071-16T4, 2019 LEXIS 1673, at *16-17 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. July 23, 2019) (emphasis added).
217 For example, under the FLSA, only the economic-realities test applies regardless
of single or joint-employment allegations. Compare Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc.,
757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985), with In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices
Litig., 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012) (both applying the economic-realities test, in single
and joint-employment contexts respectively, although each court focuses on different
factors in application).
218 Glynn, supra note 66, at 109.
219 See discussion supra Section III.A & IV.
210
211
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inquiry of employment without necessarily implicating the second. The
two inquiries are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, in the actual
application of a joint-employment case under Access Bio, at least one
putative employer must be subjected to the ABC test, while additional
putative joint-employers are subjected to the economic-realities test.
This employment liability regime has numerous flaws that lend itself to
overruling Access Bio and expanding the ABC test from simply
determining whether a worker is an employee or independent
contractor to identifying which parties are liable as joint-employers.
A. The Hierarchical Problem of Two Tests for Employment
By applying either the ABC test or the economic-realities test to
different putative employers depending on where they stand to a
putative employee, the Access Bio court creates a distinction between
“primary” and “secondary” employers.220 But how does one determine
which entity is the “primary” employer in this scenario, to be subjected
to the ABC test, and which are the “secondary” employers, to be
subjected to the economic-realities test?221 Should this determination
be made by contractual relationship, or which putative employer pays
employment taxes?222 Such a threshold analysis of determining which
entity will be subject to the ABC test and which entities will be subject
to the economic-realities test is inconsistent with the statutory language
of the NJWPL.
The NJWPL provides that employer liability is attached to any
entity “employing any person.”223 Accordingly, a person who is employed
is anyone “suffered or permitted to work by an employer,” excluding
independent contractors.224 Under Access Bio, the phrase “employing”
must inescapably have two meanings, one for the employer and one for
220 As an analogue, a California appellate court expressly embraced the concept of
“primary” and “secondary” employers in a case limiting the application of the ABC test
in joint-employment context similar to Access Bio. Curry v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, 23
Cal. App. 5th 289, 314 (2018).
221 In both Access Bio and Curry, the “primary” employer was determined by
stipulation. Neither court addresses a situation where a court must distinguish a
“primary” employer from a “secondary” employer without a party stipulation.
222 The Curry court stated in dicta that which party pays employment taxes justifies
not applying the stricter ABC test to additional putative employers because employees
are protected by California’s wage order against at least one employer. Curry, 23 Cal.
App. 5th at 314. The court did not consider or discuss how such a threshold analysis
would occur if there was no stipulated employer. Indeed, the Curry court’s reasoning
has been criticized where no defendants admit employer liability. See, e.g., Moreno v.
JCT Logistics, Inc., No. EDCV 17-2489 JGB (KKx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117342, at *17–
18 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019).
223 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(a) (2020).
224 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (2020).
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additional joint-employers.225 Such a construction creates a hierarchy
among potential joint-employers, where only one putative employer is
subjected to broader employment liability while others are not. This
construction is inconsistent with the statutory language.
Suffer-or-permit-to-work employment was crafted to prevent
employers from circumventing child labor laws through the use of
“agents, independent contractors, subsidiary or controlled companies,
or home or off-premise employees, or by any other means or device.”226
As Judge Cardozo stated in Sheffield Farms, an employer’s duty is “nondelegable” and he must “stand or fall with those whom he selects to act
for him.”227 Therefore, the plain language of suffer-or-permit-to-work
itself exists to implicate multiple potential employers.
Further, looking to the federal regulation’s interpretation of the
FLSA for guidance, it does not describe putative joint-employers in
terms of a “primary” or “secondary” relationship to each other.228 The
regulation states that “two or more employers” may be held jointly
liable for all of a particular employee’s work, not “one or more additional
joint-employers.”229 Under the NJWHL, an “employer” can include
anyone “acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee,” which perfectly mirrors the FLSA’s “employer”
definition.230 None of the statutory language of the NJWPL, NJWHL, or
the FLSA, nor the FLSA’s regulation, interpret suffer-or-permit-to-work
to distinguish multiple employers in hierarchical terms as the Access Bio
ruling necessarily creates.231 A “joint-employer” is not a different type
of employer, but simply another employer. An employer is anyone
“employing” any person, which includes those suffered or permitted to

225 Although the Access Bio court did not expand on this, the Curry court stated: “In
the joint employment context, the alleged employee is already considered an employee
of the primary employer; the issue is whether the employee is also an employee of the
alleged secondary employer.” 23 Cal. App. 5th at 314. Therefore, the ABC test is applied
to the primary employer and the economic-realities test is applied to the secondary
employer.
226 Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1100-01.
227 People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 30 (1918).
228 See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2020).
229 Id.
230 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a1(g) (2020) with 29 U.S.C.S. § 203(d) (2020).
Importantly, the Hargrove court held that the WHL and the WPL’s definition of
“employee” and “employment” should equally apply the ABC test due to their similarity
of language. Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 316 (2015).
231 Or as the Curry court expressly embraces. Curry v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, 23
Cal. App. 5th 289, 314 (2018).
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work.232 Therefore, all potential employers, whether “primary” or
“secondary,” should be identified by the ABC test.233
B. The Statutory Failure of Applying the Economic Realities Test
Even if a two-test framework for determining joint-employment
was statutorily acceptable or practically workable, the application of the
economic-realities test is problematic and should be replaced by the
ABC test. Although the economic-realities test has dominated the
application of the FLSA for the past eighty years, Judge Easterbrook
found in 1987 that the test was unsatisfactory.234 Judge Easterbrook
urged that courts should abandon the “unfocused factors” of the
economic-realities test and start again from the statute itself:
It is comforting to know that “economic reality” is the
touchstone. One cringes to think that courts might decide
these cases on the basis of economic fantasy. But “reality”
encompasses millions of facts, and unless we have a legal rule
with which to sift the material from the immaterial, we might
as well examine the facts through a kaleidoscope.235
The economic-realities test, as a legal rule, fails because the test’s
actual application by the circuit courts does not reflect the statutory
language of “suffer or permit to work.”
When Congress enacted the FLSA and suffer-or-permit-to-work
employment, it had Judge Cardozo’s judicial interpretation in mind.236
The language, written passively, could sweep up any work done for an
employer’s benefit.237 Despite the remedial purpose of the act, the
circuit courts have shown a deep reluctance to go beyond the
touchstone of control for determining the “economic reality” of an
employment relationship.238 This reluctance seems to come from the
tort origins of common law employment.239 Agency law principles were
developed to determine where a particular chain of vicarious liability

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(b) (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a1(g) (2020).
See, e.g., Moreno v. JCT Logistics, Inc., No. EDCV 17-2489 JGB (KKx), 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 117342, at *17–18 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) (The court criticized the Curry court’s
rationale because none of the putative employer defendants admitted employment
liability. “The Dynamex court later adopted the ABC test to interpret the ‘suffer or permit
to work’ standard. As Plaintiff points out, ‘Dynamex held that the ABC test applied to the
suffer or permit to work definition as to all workers.’”) (internal citations omitted).
234 Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J. concurring).
235 Id.
236 Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 1101.
237 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1543 (Easterbrook, J. concurring).
238 Glynn, supra note 66, at 117.
239 See discussion supra at Section III.A.
232
233
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should end when dealing with torts committed by agents.240 Yet, this
underlying principle has nothing to do with the purposes of FLSA or
similar suffer-or-permit-to-work regimes.241 Rutherford, the progenitor
of all the myriad economic-realities tests that have been propagated by
the circuit courts, illuminates this purpose clearly: “the [FLSA] concerns
itself with the correction of economic evils through remedies which were
unknown at common law.”242
Moreover, a cursory review of the factors considered in the Second
or Third Circuit’s leading economic-realities cases show an eerie
similarity between the right-to-control test as articulated in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency.243 The Restatement provides that the
analysis must consider the totality-of-the-circumstances, with no one
factor being dispositive or even necessary.244 These factors include, but
are not limited to: (1) the extent of supervision and physical control over
the manner and means of the service; (2) the skill required; (3) the use
of the putative employer’s equipment and premises; (4) the length of
time the person is employed; and (5) the terms of compensation.245 In
Zheng, the court chose to focus on similar factors such as: (1) the use of
the putative employer’s equipment and premise, and (2) the degree of
supervision by the putative employer over the workers.246 Enterprise
focused on other similar factors including: (1) the ability to hire and fire,
(2) the degree of supervision, and (3) the ability to set the terms of
compensation and services.247 The Enterprise court did not even
consider “economic integration”248 or the ability for the workers to

Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1544 (Easterbrook, J. concurring).
Id.
242 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947) (emphasis added).
243 The Enterprise version of the economic-realities test stands on particularly shaky
grounds because the Third Circuit heavily relied on the Ninth Circuit’s “Bonnette
factors.” These four exhaustive factors were: (1) the power to hire and fire, (2)
supervision or control of employment conditions, (3) determination of wages, and (4)
maintaining employment records. The Ninth Circuit held in later cases that these factors
are too narrow to be consistent with Rutherford. Norton, supra note 13, at 17-18.
244 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1958) with
Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730 (“[T]he determination of the relationship does not
depend on . . . isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.”).
245 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a)-(g)(a).
246 Such factors would be compatible under the right-to-control test because no
single or specific group of factors listed within the Restatement is dispositive or
necessary for determining an employment relationship. Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty
Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2003).
247 In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d
Cir. 2012).
248 See discussion supra Section 2.
240
241
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perform work for other businesses like the Zheng court.249 This
similarity between the right-to-control test and the economic-realities
test has led some courts to argue that the tests are functionally the same
thing.250
The rise of the ABC test presents an opportunity to follow Judge
Easterbrook’s suggestion and abandon the “unfocused factors” of the
economic-realities test and follow the statutory language’s expansion
beyond the touchstone of control. Unlike the Third Circuit’s economicrealities test, the ABC test is plainly different than the right-to-control
test. The ABC test requires the satisfaction of three clearly delineated
factors and only one of the three factors considers the element of
control.251 Moreover, the test is concerned with a worker’s freedom
from control.252 This approach also satisfies the plain meaning of both
“suffer” and “permit.” Written in the passive, both terms denote
something less than control. Therefore, a fortiori, a definition that
requires the showing of no control, satisfies such a standard.
The test also considers the “economic realities” of the whole
activity in prongs B and C. The “usual course of business” and
“traditionally independent trade” prongs more fully encompasses the
“economic integration” or “dependence” concepts that are articulated
by the circuit courts.253 If the work done is performed outside the usual
course of business, it is likely not a permanent relationship nor can the
work be integral to the putative employer’s business. A plumber, who
works in a traditionally independent trade, does not maintain a
permanent relationship with a cake shop, nor does her plumbing form
an integral part of the cake shop’s business.254 Likewise, the plumber
will continue in her profession after her relationship to the cake shop
has ended. Moreover, by shifting the focus onto the putative employer’s
actions, the test honors Judge Cardozo’s maxim: that liability attaches to
a putative employer for the “non-performance of a non-delegable
duty.”255 Therefore, the ABC test should be expanded to joint-

Compare In re Enter., 683 F.3d at 469-70 with Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72-74.
GLYNN, supra note 105 (citing Murray v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 613 F.3d 943,
945 (9th Cir. 2010)); Glynn, supra note 66, at 135 n. 69.
251 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(i)(6)(A)-(C).
252 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(i)(6)(A).
253 See discussion supra Section 2 (The court in DialAmerica focused on the
permanence of the putative employer-employee relationship as well as the integration
of the worker’s labor to the employer’s business to determine the level of worker
“dependence.”).
254 See discussion supra Section 2 (Plumbers are the quintessential example of an
independent contractor not typically covered by the ABC test.).
255 People ex rel. v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 30 (1918).
249
250
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employment cases because it precisely overcomes the flaws of the
economic-realities test.
C. The Economic Realities Test Fails the Remedial Purpose of
the NJWPL
Judge Easterbrook also found the economic-realities test leaves
workers “in the dark about the legal consequences of their deeds.”256
From a policy perspective, a totality-of-the-circumstances approach
leaves every analysis on a case-by-case basis, regardless of whether
there are “recurring fact patterns.”257 This vague and amorphous
approach can also lead to wildly varying outcomes.258 With every circuit
court’s list of factors, none being individually dispositive, nor any list
exhaustive, the harm caused by the economic-realities test’s application
goes beyond the frustration of lawyers and judges.259 Because of the
costs of litigation, this approach chills the ability for workers to exercise
the rights owed to them under such employment statutes that use the
economic-realities test like the FLSA. Indeed, this problem occurs for
any totality-of-the-circumstances test, including the right-to-control
test.260
When adopting the ABC test, the Hargrove court directly addressed
this flaw in totality-of-the-circumstances tests.261 The court emphasized
the remedial nature of both the FLSA and the NJWPL.262 Such
regulations strike at the “fundamental terms of the employment
relationship.”263 These wage protection laws were passed to provide
workers with income security and a private means of action to protect
that right.264 Expanded employment coverage is crucial to effectuate
that purpose.265 How can the statute achieve its remedial goals where
no worker can know with any degree of certainty whether she is entitled
256 Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J. concurring).
257 See id.
258 Glynn, supra note 66, at 117.
259 See discussion supra Section 1. Even where both the Zheng and Enterprise courts
appear to use control as the touchstone for the factors to apply, both courts come to rely
on different factors. Compare In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig.,
683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2012), with Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d
61, 72-74 (2d Cir. 2003).
260 See Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 316 (2015).
261 Id. at 313-16.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 313.
264 Id. at 313-16.
265 See Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J. concurring) (“The functions of the FLSA call for coverage.”).
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to the right of a minimum wage or overtime payment in a fissured
workplace? How can a worker have income security if her rights change
from case to case depending on where her multiple putative employers
stand to each other? A case-by-case analysis considering anything and
everything about the employment relationship is inherently incapable
of fulfilling such a purpose.
The application of an economic-realities test as a substitute in
joint-employment cases neuters the effectiveness and purpose of the
ABC test. Applying the economic-realities test to “secondary” putative
employers’ functionally limits those employers’ liability due to the high
costs for employees litigating such a fact-sensitive case-by-case
analysis.266 This framework encourages leading firms to shield
themselves from the ABC test by placing one or more third-party
“secondary” employers in between the leading firms and workers—
their sacrificial lambs.267 And with each layer of separation comes
increasing competition between the third-party labor providers, which
drives wage violations due to the difficulty of enforcement and thirdparty undercapitalization.268
The Enterprise version of the economic-realities test demands an
exacting degree of employer control, including the ability to hire and
fire, maintain employment records, and control day-to-day work.269 The
Access Bio construction leaves a large gap between workers who would
otherwise qualify as the leading firms’ employees under the ABC test270
but are not significantly controlled by the leading firm as the Enterprise
standard demands. Workers within this gap have no recourse if the
“primary” employer is judgment-proof.271 The Access Bio construction
266 See Glynn, supra note 66, at 117 (discussing the difficulty of bringing private suit
or public enforcement for employment law violations).
267 See Goldstein, et al., supra note 28, at 997-99 (1999) (noting that sweatshop
jobbers assume employment liability for the leading firm in order to take the fall).
268 See discussion supra Section II.
269 In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d
Cir. 2012). See also supra note 243 for the critique of Enterprise’s particular factors for
hewing too close to the right-to-control test.
270 Where a worker is not free from the control of the leading firm, works within the
leading firm’s usual course of business and within its business premises, or whose work
is not traditionally an independent trade. See discussion supra Section B.
271 The Curry court stated, “the policy purpose for presuming the worker to be an
employee and requiring the secondary employer to disprove the worker’s status as an
employee is unnecessary in that taxes are being paid and the worker has employment
protections.” But the court does not consider or discuss whether the ABC test’s policy
purpose for broad coverage is unnecessary where there is a judgment-proof “primary”
employer, particularly when acting in the interest of a “secondary” employer. Curry v.
Equilon Enterprises, LLC, 23 Cal. App. 5th 289, 314 (2018); see also discussion supra
Section II.
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of suffer-or-permit-to-work, which was crafted to prevent such
carefully evasive workplace structuring, is susceptible to the same game
of Whac-a-Mole that plagues wage and hour law enforcement.272
Therefore, overruling the Access Bio framework to expand the ABC test
to joint-employment is critical to fulfilling the remedial purpose of the
NJWPL. The ABC test best embodies the broad employment coverage
provided by the statutory language of suffer-or-permit-to-work
employment. The ABC test also provides workers with greater income
security by facilitating enforcement against those leading firms that
drive wage protection violations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Limiting the ABC test to the distinction between employee and
independent contractor status represents a significant obstacle to the
NJWPL’s statutory effectiveness and purpose. This approach leaves a
sizeable gap in the law’s enforcement because of the workplace fissuring
that dominates business organization today. By bounding the ABC test
to only single employment scenarios, only one potential putative
employer is subject to the broad scope of the ABC test in jointemployment cases. This limitation encourages leading firms to continue
to shed employment liability by placing sacrificial lamb “primary”
employers in between themselves and their workers. This hierarchical
framework is untenable under the statutory language of the NJWPL,
which calls for broad coverage and does not differentiate joint
employers in terms of coverage liability.
The economic-realities test that the Access Bio court adopts in place
of the ABC test is likewise inconsistent with the statutory language of
the NJWPL. This test hews too closely to the common law focus on
control, which suffer-or-permit-to-work employment was crafted to
move beyond. The limitation of the ABC test and the application of the
economic-realities test fails to fulfill the NJWPL’s statutory purpose.
This failure leaves workers vulnerable to the precise problem that the
statute was meant to prevent. Overruling the Access Bio framework is
crucial to the material fulfillment of the NJWPL’s statutory purpose.
Expanding the ABC test to joint-employment cases will give workers and
employment law enforcement a powerful tool to focus on the top level
firms that drive violations and remedy the gap left by the Access Bio
court’s holding.

272

See discussion supra Section B.

